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INFO OCT-01 IO-10 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 USIE-00 INRE-00

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 USNATO 6940

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, NATO, OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)

SUBJECT: NATOMIN: DISCUSSION ON MBFR AND CSCE, MORNING SESSION
DECEMBER 13

MADRID HOLD FOR LOWENSTEIN

GENEVA FOR CSCE DEL

SUMMARY: THIS CABLE REPORTS ON NAC MINISTERIAL DISCUSSION OF MBFR AND CSCE WHICH TOOK PLACE IN THE MORNING SESSION, DECEMBER 13. THE BULK OF THE DISCUSSION CENTERED ON WHETHER TO BEGIN STUDY OF INCLUDING A NUCLEAR OPTION IN THE ALLIES' MBFR NEGOTIATION POSITION. DUTCH FOREIGN MINISTER VAN DER STOEL TOOK THE LEAD IN ADVOCATING SUCH A STUDY WITH SYG LUNS AND ITALIAN FOREIGN MINISTER RUMOR EXPRESSING STRONG RESERVATIONS. END SUMMARY.

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1. SYG LUNS OPENED THE DISCUSSION BY NOTING THAT SEVERAL SPEAKERS WISHED TO MAKE STATEMENTS ON MBFR AND CSCE.

2. THE NETHERLANDS FOREIGN MINISTER (VAN DER STOEL) NOTED THAT THE

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS HAD BEEN UNDER WAY FOR MORE THAN A YEAR AND IT WAS DESIRABLE AT THIS STAGE TO ACHIEVE GREATER PROGRESS THAN HERETOFORE. THE MAIN ALLIED OBJECTIVE SHOULD BE TO DECREASE THE MILITARY INSTABILITY IN CENTRAL EUROPE THROUGH REDUCTION IN THE DISPARITY BETWEEN THE GROUND FORCES OF EAST AND WEST. HOWEVER, THE NETHERLANDS FAVORS A RE-EXAMINATION OF THE NATO POSITION RE THE DESIRABLE CEILING ON CONVENTIONAL FORCES AS WELL AS ON TACTICAL NUCLEAR FORCES. THE DUTCH FOREIGN MINISTER SAID SUCH A RE-EXAMINATION MUST KEEP CERTAIN ELEMENTS IN MIND: (A) NOTHING SHOULD BE DONE TO UNDERMINE THE CREDIBILITY OF THE NUCLEAR DETERRENT; (B) IT WOULD BE UNWISE TO INTRODUCE THE NUCLEAR OPTION IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE SALT AGREEMENT REACHED AT VLADIVOSTOK; (C) THERE SHOULD BE NO UNILATERAL WESTERN CONCESSIONS WITHOUT EQUIVALENT AND COMPENSATING CONCESSIONS BY THE EAST; (D) THE NUCLEAR OPTION SHOULD BE USED TO ACHIEVE APPROXIMATE PARITY BETWEEN NATO AND WP FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE. THE DUTCH FOREIGN MINISTER SAID THAT, IN HIS VIEW, THE PRESENT ALLIANCE NEGOTIATING POSITION CANNOT BE MAINTAINED FOR MUCH LONGER AND HE HOPED RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE STUDY OF THE NUCLEAR OPTION COULD BE OVERCOME, PARTICULARLY BECAUSE SUCH STUDIES WOULD TAKE SEVERAL MONTHS TO COMPLETE.

3. RE PHASING IN MBFR, THE DUTCH FOREIGN MINISTER NOTED IT MIGHT NOT BE POSSIBLE TO AGREE ON THE RESULTS OF PHASE I WITH THE EAST WITHOUT AN AGREEMENT ON THE ESSENTIAL AIMS OF PHASE II AND HE ASKED FOR AS MUCH TELESCOPING BETWEEN THE TWO PHASES AS POSSIBLE. ON THE WP'S NON-INCREASE FORMULA, VAN DER STOEL THOUGHT THE ALLIES SHOULD AWAIT THE EAST'S REACTION TO THE NATO POSITION.

4. SYG LUNS REMINDED THE DUTCH FOREIGN MINISTER THAT A STUDY WAS NOW UNDER WAY IN NATO ON THE NUCLEAR ASPECTS OF THE NUNN AMENDMENT AND THAT THE RESULTS OF THE STUDY WOULD BE AVAILABLE ABOUT APRIL 1. THE SYG UNDERSTOOD THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT WAS AWAITING NATO'S FINDINGS AS A KEY ELEMENT IN ITS OWN POLICY DELIBERATIONS ON THIS SUBJECT. LUNS EXPRESSED DOUBT OVER THE USEFULNESS OF STARTING A STUDY ON THE NUCLEAR OPTION AT A TIME
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WHEN CERTAIN KEY ELEMENTS WERE UNKNOWN PARTICULARLY BECAUSE THE U.S. INPUT INTO A STUDY OF THE NUCLEAR OPTION WAS OF THE UTMOST IMPORTANCE.

5. MINISTER VAN DER STOEL REJOINED THAT HE WAS NOT ASKING THE ALLIES TO START A STUDY ON THE NUCLEAR OPTION IMMEDIATELY AND HE REALIZED THE GREAT IMPORTANCE OF THE ONGOING NUNN AMENDMENT STUDIES FOR THE NUCLEAR ASPECTS OF MBFR. HE DID NOT, HOWEVER, WISH TO POSTPONE INDEFINITELY A STUDY OF THE NUCLEAR OPTION BECAUSE HE DETECTED INHERENT WEAKNESSES IN NATO'S PRESENT NEGOTIATING POSITION, WEAKNESSES WHICH WOULD BECOME MORE GLARING IN TIME. THE ALLIES, THEREFORE, SHOULD CONSIDER STUDYING THE NUCLEAR OPTION AT THE APPROPRIATE MOMENT.

6. LUNS REPLIED THAT THE NEGOTIATING POSITION CAN BE REVIEWED BY THE ALLIES AT ANY TIME. IN CONDUCTING SUCH A REVIEW, HOWEVER, THERE WAS NO NEED TO LINK THE CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR ISSUES.

7. BELGIAN FOREIGN MINISTER (VAN ELSLANDE) HOPED THE ALLIES WOULD MAINTAIN A COMMON FRONT ON CSCE AND NOT PURSUE INDIVIDUAL BILATERAL APPROACHES. HE THOUGHT IT IMPORTANT TO KEEP REFERENCES TO A POSSIBLE DATE AND LEVEL OF THE CONCLUSION OF CSCE "IN THE CONDITIONAL." TURNING TO MBFR, THE BELGIAN FOREIGN MINISTER REFERRED TO SECRETARY KISSINGER'S STATEMENT THE PREVIOUS DAY THAT THE WEST SHOULD REJECT THE RECENT WP NON-INCREASE PROPOSAL. THIS WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR BELGIUM TO DO, HE NOTED, BECAUSE ONE OF HIS PREDECESSORS HAD ONCE MADE A SIMILAR PROPOSAL. IN BELGIUM'S VIEW, SUCH A FREEZE COULD BE A FIRST STEP BUT THIS WOULD NOT COMPROMISE THE FINAL RESULT, WHICH SHOULD BE THE ACHIEVEMENT OF A COMMON CEILING. THE BELGIAN FOREIGN MINISTER SAID THAT DETERMINING THE STRUCTURE OF THE FINAL CEILING COULD INCLUDE THE DEFINITION OF CERTAIN INEQUALITIES. HE THOUGHT THAT DESPITE SECRETARY KISSINGER'S VIEW THAT INTRODUCTION OF THE NUCLEAR OPTION WAS PREMATURE, THE ALLIES SHOULD NOT BE PREVENTED FROM STUDYING THE NUCLEAR OPTION SINCE THE ALLIES FORESEE THE NEED TO INTRODUCE THE NUCLEAR OPTION INTO THE NEGOTIATIONS AT SOME FUTURE TIME. THE BELGIAN FOREIGN MINISTER CONCLUDED BY NOTING THAT CONSULTATIONS ON AN EVENTUAL FBS ROLE IN MBFR WERE NEEDED IN NATO, TO WHICH SYG LUNS RESPONDED THAT SUCH A STUDY WOULD NECESSARILY BE INCOMPLETE AT THIS TIME.

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8. IN A BRIEF STATEMENT ON CSCE, NORWEGIAN FOREIGN MINISTER (FRYDENLUND) EMPHASIZED HIS COUNTRY'S HOPE THAT THE OUTCOME OF CSCE WOULD INCLUDE POSITIVE RESULTS ON CBM'S. HE HOPED THE MINISTERIAL SESSION'S COMMUNIQUE WOULD GIVE A POSITIVE SIGNAL TO THE EAST ON THE ALLIANCE'S READINESS TO REACH A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF CSCE.

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INFO OCT-01 IO-10 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 USIE-00 INRE-00

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USDEL MBFR VIENNA PRIORITY

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9. THE NORWEGIAN FOREIGN MINISTER GAVE A BRIEF REPORT ON HIS COUNTRY'S NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE USSR ON THE BARENTS SEA ISSUE. NORWAY ADHERED TO THE MEDIAN LINE PRINCIPLE ALTHOUGH SOVIET VIEWS MAY REQUIRE RECOGNIZING POSSIBLE EXCEPTIONS TO THIS PRINCIPLE. NORWAY, HOWEVER, WILL RESIST ELEMENTS THE SOVIET SIDE MAY SEEK TO INTRODUCE WHICH ARE NOT IN CONFORMITY WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW.

ON SPITZBERGEN, THE NORWEGIAN FOREIGN MINISTER SAID THERE WAS NO SOVIET PRESSURE TO AMEND THE TREATY OF SPITZBERGEN. THE SOVIETS HAVE RECOGNIZED NORWEGIAN SOVEREIGNTY OVER SPITZBERGEN BUT HAVE SOUGHT PRIOR CONSULTATIONS WITH NORWAY ON THE APPLICATION OF NORWEGIAN ADMINISTRATIVE MEASURES. THE NON-DISCRIMINATORY CHARACTER OF THE SPITZBERGEN TREATY IS AN ESSENTIAL PART OF NORWEGIAN POLICY.

10. IN SUMMING UP THE DISCUSSION OF THE NUCLEAR OPTION IN THE MBFR, SYG LUNS SAID THIS ISSUE COULD BE BROUGHT UP IN THE NAC AT ANY
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TIME SO THAT THE ALLIES COULD DETERMINE WHETHER THEY WISHED TO PROCEED WITH A STUDY OF THE NUCLEAR OPTION AND THE TIMING FOR SUCH A STUDY.

11. ITALIAN FOREIGN MINISTER (RUMOR) STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF WESTERN COHESION IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE PROGRESS IN DETENTE, SPECIFICALLY IN THE CSCE AND MBFR NEGOTIATIONS. HE AGREED WITH THE VIEW EXPRESSED THE PREVIOUS DAY BY SECRETARY KISSINGER THAT THE ALLIANCE NEEDS TO MAINTAIN UNITY IN ITS OBJECTIVES AS A PRE-CONDITION FOR BUILDING A STRUCTURE OF RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE EAST. NOTING THAT SOME PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE IN CSCE, RUMOR STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ALLIES STICKING TO THEIR ESSENTIAL OBJECTIVES AND ARRIVING AT A "COHERENT AND UNIFIED" JUDGEMENT AS TO WHEN THE RESULTS ACHIEVED WOULD WARRANT CONCLUSION OF CSCE.

12. ON MBFR, RUMOR NOTED THAT THE EAST THUS FAR HAD NOT SHOWN THE NECESSARY FLEXIBILITY REQUIRED TO ACHIEVE SIGNIFICANT RESULTS. HE THOUGHT IT NECESSARY FOR THE ALLIES TO RE-STUDY THE WHOLE MBFR SITUATION, BUT THAT STUDY OF THE NUCLEAR

OPTION WOULD BE PREMATURE AT THIS STAGE ALTHOUGH A STUDY OF THE NUCLEAR OPTION MIGHT BE NEEDED IN THE FUTURE. HE CAUTIONED AGAINST "HASTY DECISIONS" AND THOUGHT THE ALLIES SHOULD STUDY THE POSSIBILITY OF MAKING THEIR PRESENT NEGOTIATING PROPOSAL SOMEWHAT MORE ATTRACTIVE TO THE EAST, BUT THIS SHOULD NOT BE AT THE EXPENSE OF COMPROMISING ALLIED POSITIONS ON SEPARATE PHASES AND A COMMON CEILING.

13. CANADIAN SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS(MACEACHEN) SAID THAT THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL SHOULD ASSURE THAT THE ALLIANCE'S POSITION ON MBFR WAS BOTH REALISTIC AND CREDIBLE TO WESTERN PUBLIC OPINION. HE OPINED THAT THE TIME MAY HAVE COME TO ADD NEW ELEMENTS TO THE WESTERN POSITION ON MBFR.
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